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How the Coronavirus Crisis 
Challenges International 
Investment (Customary) Law 




The COVID-19 pandemic is affecting every aspect of our daily life; 
what’s more, it is affecting and will affect for some years from now the 
global economy. The present working paper offers a reflection on how 
State’s restrictive trade measures are affecting foreign investors’ rights. 
The study investigates how the exceptional circumstances of the 
COVID-19 pandemic can justify State’s measures affecting foreign 
investors’ rights and whether they can be legally justified under the 
customary international rule of the necessity defense. 
The first part of the paper will analyze the requirements of the 
states of necessity, as codified in article 25 of the ILC Draft Article. 
The second part of the paper will apply the requirements of the 
customary law rule of the necessity defense to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
taken into account national measures that have been taken by States 
during this period; it will be questioned whether the global and 
exceptional circumstances of the spread of COVID-19 will influence 
(and maybe change) the way we interpret and apply this customary 
rule. 
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I. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
international investment policies: an introductory 
overview 
We are in the midst of the one of the “greatest economic, financial 
and social shock[s] of the 21st century”—as the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) Secretary 
General, Angel Gurría has labelled the COVID-19 health crisis.1 The 
COVID-19 pandemic2 (“Pandemic”) is affecting every aspect of our 
daily lives. What’s more, it is affecting, and will likely affect, the global 
 
1. OECD Secretary-General: Coronavirus ‘War’ Demands Joint Action, 
OECD (Mar. 21, 2020), http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecd-secretary-
general-coronavirus-war-demands-joint-action.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3C7L-4NLA]. 
2. The World Health Organization [hereinafter WHO] defined the COVID-
19 outbreak as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on 
January 30, 2020 and, on March 11, 2020, declared it a pandemic. See the 
WHO, Statement on the Second Meeting of the International Health 
Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee Regarding the Outbreak of 




[https://perma.cc/BN9E-TSMY]; WHO Director-General’s Opening 
Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
(Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-
general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-
2020 [https://perma.cc/S53F-HS2G]; see generally Armin von Bogdandy 
& Pedro Villarreal, International Law on Pandemic Response: A First 
Stocktaking in Light of the Coronavirus Crisis, in MPIL RSCH, SERIES 
(Raffaela Kunz ed.) (forthcoming); Philippe Sands, COVID-19 
Symposium: COVID-19 and International Law, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 30, 
2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/03/30/symposium-covid-19-and-
international-law [https://perma.cc/L3KZ-TP42]  
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economy for years after, including international investment flows.3 
Actually, financial and economic crises have always affected investment 
policies worldwide.4 The 2008–2009 financial and economic crisis led to 
unemployment, debt, low growth, and poor access to financing across 
Europe.5 This resulted inter alia in reduced foreign direct investment 
(“FDI”) in the EU.6 Foreign investors worldwide were prudent in 
making their investment decisions as the risk of facing insolvency was 
very high.7 Indeed, when a state is coping with an economic crisis, its 
domestic legislation undergoes constant change.8 In such circumstances 
of legal uncertainty, foreign investors find it difficult to make adequate 
business decisions, which negatively influences FDI inflows in the 
country.9  
This is even more true when we consider the current COVID-19 
crisis: the Pandemic is something new,10 and this 
health/economic/social crisis is incomparable in our modern history.11 
Most countries have declared national state of emergencies and are 
adopting restrictive measures (e.g. social distancing, quarantines and 
even state control of certain strategic companies) on the ground of 
exceptional circumstances.12 Some countries have established export 
controls over certain medical products (e.g. medical ventilators, certain 
drugs, personal protective equipment) in the form of temporary export 
 
3. Adnan Seric & Jostein Hauge, Foreign Direct Investments Could 
Contract by 40% This Year, Hitting Developing Countries Hardest, 




4. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment 
Prospects Survey 2010–2012, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/4 (Aug. 31, 
2010). 
5. Id. at 1. 
6. Id. 
7. See id. at 5. 
8. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Assessing the Impact of 
the Current Financial and Economic Crisis on Global FDI Flows, 41–46, 
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/3 (Apr. 2009). 
9. See id. at 44–45. 
10. See OECD Secretary-General: Coronavirus ‘War’ Demands Joint Action, 
supra note 1. 
11. Id. 
12. Sándor Lénárd, The COVID-19 and the ‘State of Necessity’, MANDINER 
(Apr. 13, 2020), 
https://precedens.mandiner.hu/cikk/20200413_the_covid_19_and_the
_state_of_necessity [https://perma.cc/29MG-FHEW] (interviewing 
Federica Cristani). 
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bans or the addition of licensing/authorisation requirements.13 Other 
countries, concerned with food security, have introduced export 
restrictions over specific agricultural products.14 Most countries are 
introducing screening mechanisms on foreign investment, with the aim 
to safeguard national businesses from foreign hostile takeovers.15 Such 
measures have a great impact on international trade and investment.16 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(“UNCTAD”) latest estimates project a dramatic 30–50% drop in FDI 
flows worldwide for 2021, with the hardest-hit sector being 
Manufacturing.17 
Accordingly, states around the world are adopting investment-
related policies and regulations that aim to stimulate foreign 
investment and conversely, reinforce their own national economies.18 
Overall, this approach can be detrimental to the rights of foreign 
investors that are guaranteed by international investment treaties and 
customary law rules. 
This Article investigates how states’ new trade and investment 
regulatory measures are affecting and will likely affect foreign investors’ 
rights, and to what extent the exceptional circumstances of the 
Pandemic can justify such measures under international investment 
law. 
A. States’ regulatory measures affecting foreign investors during the 
pandemic 
The UNCTAD is constantly monitoring the national regulatory 
measures countries around the world are adopting to address the 
 
13. COVID-19: Measures Affecting Trade in Goods, WORLD TRADE ORG. 
(Oct. 7, 2020), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_goods
_measure_e.htm [https://perma.cc/K44N-YY2A]. 
14. See Agency Chiefs Issue Joint Call to Keep Food Trade Flowing in 
Response to COVID-19, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/igo_26mar20_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/C8R7-PYC3], for the joint statement by the Directors-
General of the Food and Agriculture Organization, the WHO and the 
WTO, who remarked that “[u]ncertainty about food availability can spark 
a wave of [additional] export restrictions, creating a shortage on the global 
market.” 
15. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment 
Report 2020, 92, UNCTAD/WIR/2020 (June 2020). 
16. Id. at 88. 
17. Id. at 5–7. 
18. See Press Release, World Trade Org., Trade Set to Plunge as COVID-19 
Pandemic Upends Global Economy (Apr. 8, 2020), for a general overview 
of trade measures that states are adopting to face the COVID-19 
pandemic crisis.  
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Pandemic.19 These measures are diverse in nature and scope, ranging 
from measures supporting investors and domestic economies in general, 
to policies aimed at protecting critical domestic infrastructure and 
industries, particularly in the health sector.20 For the most part, they 
affect future FDI inflows and respond to two main concerns: 1) offering 
incentives to prospective foreign investors (trying to face the 
forthcoming FDI inflow breakdown); and 2) safeguarding national 
critical infrastructures (by applying screening mechanisms).21  
Among the different regional realities around the world, the 
European Union (“EU”) is quite interesting because it enjoys exclusive 
competence over international trade matters.22 This covers trade in 
goods and services, commercial aspects of intellectual property, and—
since the 2009 Lisbon Treaty—FDI.23 However, despite several 
interventions by EU institutions on FDI policies, a regional uniform 
approach is still lacking on foreign investment policies and thus many 
uncertainties remain.24 This lack of uniformity becomes even more 
evident in times of economic crises, where states tend to adopt economic 
and financial decisions at the national level without (or with very little) 
coordination at the regional level (with the EU).25 Indeed, some EU 
member states have autonomously adopted national measures 
regarding FDI; for example, France expanded its foreign investment 
screening regime by broadening the relevant sectoral scope.26 Italy 
increased the scope of disclosure requirements and extended the 
timeframe for review procedures, while also introducing the so-called 
golden power mechanism to protect strategic national businesses from 
 
19. See Investment Policy Monitor, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor 
[https://perma.cc/75U9-3NRA]. 
20. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investment Policy Monitor, 
1 (Apr. 2020). 
21. See id. 
22. See generally Stephen Woolcock, Directorate-General for External 
Policies, The EU Approach to International Investment Policy After the 
Lisbon Treaty, EXPO/B/INTA/FWC/2009-01/Lot7/07-08-09 (Oct. 
2010). 
23. See id. at 6.  
24. See id. at 14–15. 
25. See id. at 10.  
26. France — Government Extends FDI Screening Regime as a Response to 
the COVID-19 Pandemics, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV.: INV. 
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foreign hostile takeovers.27 Spain suspended the liberalization of the 
foreign investment regime in its territory with regard to some critical 
areas, such as infrastructure, technologies and media.28 Most countries 
are adopting measures to support domestic industries through state 
subsidies; for example, Germany is considering measures to protect its 
national industrial sector,29 and the Italian deputy economic minister 
stressed that Italy will not “become someone’s shopping territory.”30 
Simultaneously, the EU is adopting supporting measures.31 Among 
those measures is an allowance for member states to adopt maximum 
flexibility when applying EU rules on state aid measures—to support 
national businesses and workers—and on public finances and fiscal 
policies, with a view to accommodate exceptional national spending.32 
 
27. See Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic, the Government Strengthens its 
Special Powers in Strategic Sectors, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV.: 




[https://perma.cc/SFN3-6FRN]; see also Francesca Torricelli & Pietro 
Missanelli, Italian Law: Corporate Transparency and ‘Golden Power’ 
Provisions in Emergency Legislation for Coronavirus Disease 2019, 




28. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investment Policy 
Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 8 (May 2020). 
29. See Responses to COVID-19 by Tightening FDI Screening, U.N. CONF. 
ON TRADE & DEV.: INV. POLICY MONITOR (May 20, 2020), 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-
monitor/measures/3526/germany-responses-to-covid-19-by-tightening-
fdi-screening [https://perma.cc/Y3Q3-XUKR].  
30. Giuseppe Fonte, Italy to Defend ‘Strategic Companies’ from Foreign 




31. See A European Roadmap to Lifting Coronavirus Containment 
Measures, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-
eu/health/coronavirus-response/european-roadmap-lifting-coronavirus-
containment-measures_en [https://perma.cc/6AN3-QB4Q]. 
32. See COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic, COUNCIL OF THE EUR. UNION, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/covid-19-coronavirus-
outbreak-and-the-eu-s-response [https://perma.cc/P8KT-HEHA]; see 
also Guidance on Customs Issues Related to the COVID-19 Emergency, 
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In the field of FDI, it is worth recalling the recent guidelines 
published by the European Commission (“Commission”) directing 
member states on how to deal with FDI and, in particular, on how to 
apply the 2019 FDI Screening Regulation during the Pandemic.33  
On March 19, 2019, the EU adopted Regulation 2019/452 (“FDI 
Screening Regulation”), which established a framework for the 
screening of foreign direct investments into the EU from non-EU 
countries.34 Such a framework aims to establish a cooperation 
mechanism where member states and the Commission can exchange 
information regarding the screening of FDI on the grounds of security 
and public order.35 The Regulation, as specified in the 2017 Background 
Communication of the Commission, should “[w]elcom[e] foreign direct 
investment while protecting essential interests” of member states and 
the EU.36 The Regulation took effec October 11, 2020.37 Previously, on 
March 25, 2020, the Commission drafted guidelines on how to use the 
FDI screening mechanism in a time of public health crisis.38  
As of the date of this writing, national foreign direct investment 
screening mechanisms are in place in 14 member states (including, Italy, 
Spain, and France).39 The Commission stated that, 
 
“Today more than ever, the EU’s openness to foreign investment 
needs to be balanced by appropriate screening tools. In the 
context of the COVID-19 emergency, there could be an increased 
risk of attempts to acquire healthcare capacities . . . or related 
industries such as research establishments (for instance 
developing vaccines) via foreign direct investment. . . . At present, 
the responsibility for screening FDI rests with Member States. 
 
emergency_en#heading_9 [https://perma.cc/VCJ4-DLFL], for a list of 
exceptional measures taken by the customs authorities of member states 
during the COVID-19 crisis.  
33. See Regulation 2019/452, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 19 March 2019 Establishing a Framework for the Screening of Foreign 
Direct Investments into the Union, 2019 O.J. (L 79) 1, 1. 
34. Id.  
35. Id. at 2.  
36. Welcoming Foreign Direct Investment While Protecting Essential 
Interests, at 1, COM (2017) 494 final (Sept. 9, 2017). 
37. Regulation 2019/452, supra note 33, at 12. 
38. See Guidance to the Member States Concerning Foreign Direct 
Investment and Free Movement of Capital from Third Countries, and the 
Protection of Europe’s Strategic Assets, Ahead of the Application of 
Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (FDI Screening Regulation), at 1, COM (2020) 
1981 final (Mar. 25, 2020) [hereinafter Guidance to the Member States]. 
39. Id. at 2, Annex. 
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FDI screening should take into account the impact on the 
European Union as a whole, in particular with a view to ensuring 
the continued critical capacity of EU industry, going well beyond 
the healthcare sector.”40 
The Commission further specified, “investments that do not 
constitute FDI, i.e. portfolio investments, may be screened by the 
Member States in compliance with the Treaty provisions on free 
movement of capital.”41 Moreover, “[b]esides investment screening, 
Member States may retain special rights in certain undertakings 
(“golden shares”). . . . Like other restrictions to capital movements, 
they must be necessary and proportionate to achieve a legitimate public 
policy objective.”42 Accordingly, the Commission advised member 
states not only on FDI (which are under the exclusive competence of 
the EU), but also on portfolio investment and golden shares, whose 
regulations remain under the competence of the member states, in 
compliance with the EU rules of the internal market.43 And in this 
respect, the Commission made it clear that “[g]rounds of public policy, 
public security and public health can be relied on [for restrictions for 
capital movements] if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat 
to a fundamental interest of society”44 and that “[t]he permissible 
grounds of justification may also be interpreted more broadly.”45  
Regarding the consequences of such measures to foreign investors 
in the EU, it is useful to make some distinctions 1) between foreign 
investors already present in host states that are or will be affected by 
national measures (e.g. nationalizations of foreign investment during 
the period of emergency or state aid measures addressed to national 
businesses) and incoming foreign investors; and 2) with regard to 
incoming foreign investors, as already seen, the measures of the host 
state likely to affect them can be divided between incentives and 
restrictions following screening mechanisms. 
Since all such measures are very new (and other measures will likely 
be adopted), it is too early to predict exactly how they will be applied 
and the exact economic consequences they will produce. However, we 
 
40. Id. at 1. 
41. Id. at 2, Annex. 
42. Id. 
43. Axel Schulz, Genevra Forwood, Orion Berg, & Matthias Vangenechten, 
COVID-19 – Commission Issues Guidelines to Protect European Critical 




44. Guidance to the Member States, supra note 38, at 3, Annex.  
45. Id.  
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might elaborate on some questions that states should address to avoid 
international responsibility for breaching international obligations 
under international investment law.46 In particular, foreign investors 
may likely question the breach of international investment obligations 
by host states, claiming that the national measures constitute a breach 
of non-discrimination and fair and equitable treatment, or amount to 
indirect expropriation.47 For example, to support the national 
healthcare systems, Spain48 and Ireland49 have decided to temporarily 
nationalize private hospitals; Italy has also adopted several emergency 
measures including, among others,50 the temporary or permanent 
requisition of medical devices from private businesses.51 
In this respect, it is crucial to understand to what extent the 
exceptional circumstances of the Pandemic can justify states’ measures 
 
46. See generally Pieter Bekker, International Law in Times of Crisis: 
COVID-19 and Foreign Investments, LEXOLOGY (May 4, 2020), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c8c46035-4e4f-4f9f-
8f16-66b23b5942a0 [https://perma.cc/BZ4E-SXZ3].  
47. See Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Sarah Brewin, & Nyaguthii 
Maina, Protecting Against Investor–State Claims Amidst COVID-19: A 
Call to Action for Governments, IISD (Apr. 14, 2020), 
https://www.iisd.org/articles/protecting-against-investor-state-claims-
amidst-covid-19-call-action-governments [https://perma.cc/EJY4-
LFPV]; Michael Ostrove, Kate Brown de Vejar, & Ben Sanderson, 
COVID-19 — a Legitimate Basis for Investment Claims?, DLA PIPER – 




48. Adam Payne, Spain has Nationalized all of its Private Hospitals as the 




49. Órla Ryan, Private Hospitals will be Made Public for Duration of 
Coronavirus Pandemic, THE JOURNAL (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://www.thejournal.ie/private-hospitals-ireland-coronavirus-
5056334-Mar2020/ [https://perma.cc/279L-F589] 
50. Massimo Benedetteli, Caterina Coroneo, & Nicolò Minella, Could COVID-
19 Emergency Measures Give Rise to Investment Claims? First 
Reflections from Italy, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REV. (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1222354/could-covid-19-
emergency-measures-give-rise-to-investment-claims-first-reflections-from-
italy [https://perma.cc/PS7A-ZYR9].  
51. Carloandrea Meacci, Law Decree No 18 of 17 March 2020 - Cura Italia 
Decree, ASHURST – NEWS & INSIGHTS (March 30, 2020), 
https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/law-
decree-no-18-of-17-march-2020---cura-italia-decree/ 
[https://perma.cc/7PVZ-VFJP]; see also Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra 
note 47.  
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affecting foreign investors’ rights. The following Section II illustrates 
the tools international investment law offers to states for measures 
adopted under exceptional circumstances and how states can apply 
these measures during the Pandemic. 
II. Justifications for States’ exceptional measures 
affecting foreign investors’ rights under 
international (investment) law 
Foreign investors may rightly question a breach of international 
investment obligations by host states, claiming that the national trade 
and investment-related measures adopted to cope with the Pandemic 
constitute a breach of international obligations that are guaranteed in 
the relevant international investment agreements [“IIAs”].52 
Accordingly, foreign investors may bring host states before 
international investment arbitral tribunals — as provided for in IIAs 
— and ask for reparation.53 Indeed, some investment arbitration cases 
have already started.54 According to an open letter sent in June 2020 
by the Seattle to Brussels Network to national governments and signed 
by 630 organizations, “from 1 March until 25 May 2020 when most 
governments were in the midst of the Pandemic, 12 new [investor-state 
dispute settlement] cases were filed . . . . Most of those were against 
Latin American countries . . . : Colombia (3 cases), Peru (2), Panama 
(1), Mexico (1), Dominican Republic (1), Norway (1), Croatia (1), 
Serbia (1), Romania (1).”55 
 
52. See generally Kevin O’Gorman et al., Investor-State Claims in the Era of 
the COVID-19 Pandemic, 14 NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT INT’L ARB. 
REP. 17 (Jun. 2020).  
53. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 47. Most IIAs provide for investor-
state dispute settlement mechanisms, according to which the foreign 
investor may bring the host state before an independent and international 
arbitral. Id. 
54. See generally Maxi Scherer et al., International Arbitration and the 




55. Open Letter to Governments on ISDS and COVID-19, SEATTLE TO 
BRUSSELS NETWORK (June 2020), http://s2bnetwork.org/sign-the-pen-
letter-to-governments-on-isds-and-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/5RAB-
9C8S]; see also BRETTON WOODS PROJECT, Fears of lawsuits at World 
Bank’s tribunal constrain efforts to fight pandemic, THE BRETTON 
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International investment law gives host states two kinds of defenses 
in case of investment claims:56 1) exceptions envisaged by the applicable 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) or IIA giving a safeguard to 
regulations that were created for, among other reasons, the 
maintenance of public order or the protection public health (called non-
precluded measure clauses);57 and 2) defenses under customary 
international law-most notably, the state of necessity and force 
majeure, as codified by the International Law Commission in the 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
[“ILC Articles”].58 
Moreover, it has also been proposed (regarding measures taken 
during the 2008-2009 financial and economic crisis) that treaty 
obligations under IIAs might be temporarily suspended during a grave 
crisis, as a consequence of Article 62 of Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, according to which a “fundamental change of 
circumstances” may justify the termination, withdrawal, or suspension 
of the treaty when “the existence of those circumstances constituted an 
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty” 
and “the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of 
obligations” — e.g. a host state might claim an essential necessity to 
privilege primarily for domestic investors due to a severe national 
economic situation.59 
The following sections of this Article are devoted specifically to the 
state of necessity defense, which has already been invoked by host states 
to justify breach of international investment obligations due to national 
economic and financial crises.60 Then, this Article will investigate 
whether and to what extent such defense can be relied on as a 
 
56. See generally Federica Paddeu & Kate Parlett, COVID-19 and Investment 
Treaty Claims, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 30, 2020), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/03/30/covid-19-and-
investment-treaty-claims [https://perma.cc/MZ5W-5DXX]. 
57. See generally Alex Martinez, Invoking States Defences in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010).  
58. G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 23 (Jan. 28, 2002); see also JAMES CRAWFORD, 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY (2002) [hereinafter ILC COMMENTARY]; see also William 
Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in 
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-
Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. 
J. INT’L L., 307–410 (2008). 
59. See Hermann Ferré & Kabir Duggal, The World Economic Crisis as a 
Changed Circumstance, 43 COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES (Aug. 1, 
2011); Lénárd, supra note 12.  
60. See generally Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 58.  
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justification for the breach of obligations towards foreign investors 
during the Pandemic. 
III. State of necessity as a justification for the host 
state in investment claims 
As mentioned, international investment law offers a number of 
instruments to host states to relieve their international responsibilities, 
towards foreign investors, when facing exceptional circumstances.61 
Most IIAs already include provisions that provide host states with 
different lines of defense in investment claims brought by foreign 
investors, such as non-precluded measure clauses, which allow states to 
adopt measures to protect public objectives.62  
When such clauses are not expressly included in IIAs though , states 
may turn to customary international law defenses, like the state of 
necessity, codified in the ILC Articles as one of the “circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness.” 63 
The necessity defense was Argentina’s core defense in a set of 
investment claims it faced against U.S. investors following the country’s 
2001-2002 financial and economic crisis.64  
The proceeding Sections illustrate how the ILC Articles codified the 
customary defense of necessity and how the defense has been applied 
by investment arbitral tribunals; this preliminary overview is necessary 
to understand what circumstances the Pandemic can successfully justify 
the invocation of the necessity defense by host states in investment 
claims. 
A. The requirements of the necessity defense under customary 
international law, as codified in article 25 of the ILC Articles and applied 
so far by investment arbitral tribunals 
Under general international law, the concept of necessity has been 
subject to an evolving interpretation. However, it was finally codified 
in Chapter V of the 2001 ILC Articles as one of the circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness.65 According to Article 25—which has come to 
be considered as reflecting customary international law on necessity—
 
61. Id. 
62. Michael Ostrove et al., State Defences to Investment Claims Arising From 




63. Id.  
64. Id.  
65. See id.; see also ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 58, at ch. V.  
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66 a State may not invoke necessity as a ground for precluding the 
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international 
obligation, unless the act is the only way for the State to safeguard an 
essential interest against a grave and imminent peril and the act does 
not seriously impair the essential interest of another states of the 
international community.67 Additionally, a state cannot invoke the 
defense if it has contributed to the situation of necessity.68  
The cumulative conditions that must be met by a state to be able 
to successfully invoke this defense, according to Article 25 of the ILC 
Articles, are the following:  
 
(1) The act in question must be the only way for the State to 
safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril.69 
The plea of necessity is excluded if there are other lawful means 
available to protect the “essential interest” at stake, even if they are 
more costly or less convenient.70 The “only way” requirement has been 
interpreted by international practice in a very strict way. For example, 
the International Court of Justice, in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, found that 
Hungary had other means than suspending and abandoning works 
under the 1977 treaty with Czechoslovakia, even though these other 
means would have involved “a more costly technique”.71 Regarding the 
meaning of “essential interests”, the 2001 ILC Commentary specifies 
that “necessity consists not in danger to the lives of individuals in the 
charge of a State official but in a grave danger either to the essential 
interests of the State or the internationally community as a whole”.72 
Here, the question of defining whether an interest is “essential” is very 
 
66. See Ostrove et al., supra note 62.  
67. Id. 
68. See ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 58, at art. 25 (“1. Necessity may not 
be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an 
act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless 
the act: (a) is the only means for the State to safeguard an essential 
interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) does not seriously 
impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which an 
obligation exists, or the international community as a whole. 2. in any 
case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding 
wrongfulness if: (a) the international obligation in question excludes the 
possibility of invoking necessity; or (b) the State has contributed to the 
situation of necessity”). 
69. Ostrove et al., supra note 62.  
70. Id.  
71. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 
Rep. 7, ¶ 55 (Sept. 25) [hereinafter Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros].  
72. See ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 58, ¶ 2.  
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fact specific.73 Furthermore, according to Article 25, the state’s 
“essential interest” should be threatened by a “grave and imminent 
peril”.74 In Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, the International Court of Justice 
observed that the “imminence” requirement has to be interpreted as 
“immediacy” or “proximity”, and not as a merely “possibility” of the 
peril.75  
 
(2) The State’s act must not seriously impair an essential interest 
of another State or of the international community as a whole.76 In 
particular, a plea of necessity is valid if the “the interest relied on […] 
outweigh[s] all other considerations”.77 
 
(3) The State cannot invoke necessity if it has contributed to the 
situation of necessity.78 In its 2001 Commentary, the ILC emphasized 
that “the contribution to the situation of necessity must be sufficiently 
substantial and not merely incidental or peripheral.”79 This view was 
also endorsed by the International Court of Justice in Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros, when it stated Hungary could not invoke the necessity 
defense since “it had helped, by act or omission to bring it about”.80 
 
Finally, if a situation of necessity is found, it should be assessed in 
the period during which it was applicable.81 As stated in Article 27 of 
the ILC Articles, “the invocation of a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness . . . is without prejudice to: (a) compliance with the 
obligation in question, if and to the extent that the circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness no longer exists.”82 Accordingly, as soon as the 
situation of “grave and imminent peril” ceases, the State’s conduct is 
not justified by necessity and is unlawful under international law.83 
 
73. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 251 (July 25, 2007). 
74. G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 58, at art. 25(1).  
75. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, supra note 71, ¶¶ 42, 54.  
76. G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 58, at art. 25(1)(b).  
77. ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 58, ¶ 17.  
78. G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 58, at art. 25(2).  
79. ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 58, ¶ 20. 
80. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 
Rep 7, ¶ 57 (Sept. 25).  
81. Id. ¶ 54.  
82. G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 58, at art. 27(a).  
83. See generally LG&E Energy Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, (July 25, 2007). 
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Once assessed the existence of the state of necessity, Article 27 of 
the ILC Articles further establishes the possibility of compensation for 
any material loss caused by the measures adopted.84 However, the ILC 
Articles are not specific about the modalities of compensations; some 
tribunals, such as the one in LG&E v. Argentina, “decided that the 
damages suffered during the state of necessity should be borne by the 
investor,”85 while others, such as that in BG v. Argentina,86 decided 
that, even if a situation of necessity is established, states have an 
obligation to compensate investors for damages occurred during the 
period of necessity.87 
As mentioned above, more than 40 cases were brought against 
Argentina in the early 2000s regarding international investment law.88 
Claimants (mostly U.S. private investors) alleged that the Argentine 
Government’s regulatory measures adopted to cope with the financial 
crisis that hit the country in 2001 had breached a number of BITs 
obligations.89  
In most of the cases, Argentina invoked the necessity defense to 
justify the alleged violations of applicable BITs, relying on both the 
emergency clause included in Article XI of the applicable 1991 US-
Argentina BIT90 and on the customary rule of necessity.91 Investment 
arbitral tribunals, which had to deal with such pleas in the Argentinean 
cases, recognized the possibility to invoke such a justification in case of 
financial and economic crises.92 However, they did not deal with the 
 
84. G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 58, at art. 27(b).  
85. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 264 (July 25, 2007).  
86. BG Group Plc. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL case, Final Award, ¶ 
382 (Dec. 24, 2007). 
87. Id. ¶ 409.  
88. William W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability 
under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO 
& INT’L HEALTH L & POL’Y 199, 204 (2008). 
89. BG Group Plc. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL case, Final Award, ¶ 
86(b) (Dec. 24, 2007). 
90. Burke-White, supra note 88, at 205; see generally Treaty Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Arg.–U.S., art. 
XI, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124 (1992) [hereinafter Arg.–U.S. BIT] 
(stating “this Treaty shall not preclude the application . . . of measures 
necessary for . . . the Protection of [a Party’s] own essential security 
interests” and invoked in the majority of Argentina’s investment 
arbitration cases). 
91. Burke-White, supra note 88, at 205. 
92. Avidan Kent & Alexandra R. Harrington, The Plea of Necessity under 
Customary International Law: A Critical Review in Light of the Argentine 
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necessity defense in the same way, resulting in inconsistent decisions.93 
Since the treaty-based emergency clause included in Article XI of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT refers to a situation of “emergency,” which is 
similar to the concept of “necessity,”94 as it has frequently been 
interpreted and applied by arbitral tribunals through reliance on Article 
25 of the ILC Articles.95 This approach—and generally the relationship 
between treaty-based emergency clauses and the customary rule of 
necessity defense—was subject to judicial and scholarly debate,96 which 
goes expands beyond this article’s scope. What concerns this article is 
how the customary rule of necessity defense has been interpreted and 
applied in the context of international investment arbitration so far (in 
particular the “pre-Pandemic” period). 
In almost all of the previously mentioned cases, Argentina argued 
that the gravity of the crisis affecting the country threatened the very 
existence of the State97 and the need to face the situation had led to 
the adoption of the national measures that allegedly impaired U.S. 
foreign investors.98 As for the application of the necessity defense under 
customary international law (as codified in Article 25 of the ILC 
Articles),99 according to Argentina, the measures adopted were the 
“only means” to safeguard an essential interest against a “grave and 
 
Cases, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 
246, 247 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles, eds., 2011).  
93. Id.  
94. Compare Arg.–U.S. BIT, supra note 90, at Art. IV(3) (referring to war or 
other armed conflict, revolution, state of national emergency, insurrection, 
civil disturbance or other similar events) with G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 
58, at art. 25(1)(a) (treating necessity as the only way for the State to 
safeguard essential interests against grave and imminent peril). 
95. Robert M. Ziff, The Sovereign Debtor’s Prison: Analysis of the Argentine 
Crisis Arbitrations and the Implications for Investment Treaty Law, 10 
RICH J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 345, 366–68 (2011). 
96. See, e.g., Christina Binder, Changed Circumstances in Investment Law: 
Interfaces between the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility 
with a Special Focus on the Argentine Crisis, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 608–630 (Christina Binder et 
al. eds., 2009) (examining the relationship between treaty-based 
emergency clauses and the rule of necessity in customary international 
law). 
97. See Enron Corp et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
Award, ¶ 289 (May 22, 2007); see also Sempra Energy International v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 326 (Sept. 
28, 2007). 
98. See Enron Corp et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
Award, ¶ 290 (May 22, 2007). 
99. ILC Commentary, supra note 58, at Art. 25. 
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imminent peril.”100 Moreover, Argentina maintained it did not 
contributed to the situation of necessity, since most of the intervening 
factors were exogenous.101 
Claimants (private investors), instead, generally maintained that 
Argentina could not rely on the necessity defense under customary 
international law.102 According to the claimants, the Argentine crisis 
had its origins in endogenous factors and resulted from Argentina’s own 
policy failures (particularly, from the failure to implement its structural 
reforms in the 1990s and to ensure open foreign trade and the 
maintenance of the currency board’s credibility).103 Moreover, the 
economic crisis could not fall within the concept of “essential 
interests,”104 which should be “limited to war, natural disaster and other 
situations threatening the existence of the State.”105 
Most arbitral tribunals stated that Argentina somehow contributed 
to the situation of economic emergency because of bad decisions taken 
at the governmental level.106 Accordingly, the arbitrators did not agree 
that Argentina could claim a state of emergency.107 However, most of 
the arbitral decisions agreed that in principle a grave economic crisis, 
likely to undermine the social structure of a state, might amount to a 
situation of necessity.108 Most notable, arbitral tribunals in CMS,109 
 
100. Enron Corp et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
Award, ¶ 295 (May 22, 2007); Sempra Energy International v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 334 (Sept. 28, 2007).  
101. See Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 342 (Sept. 28, 2007) (referencing the First Expert 
Report of Professor Nouriel Roubini of July 13, 2005). See also Enron 
Corp et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 
297 (May 22, 2007) (referencing the Expert Opinion of Nouriel Roubini 
of February 24, 2005). 
102. See, e.g., Enron Corp et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 299 (May 22, 2007). 
103. Id. ¶ 301 (referencing the Expert Opinion of Professor Sebastián Edwards 
of April 27, 2005); see also Sempra Energy International v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 341 (Sept. 28, 2007) 
(referencing the Expert Report of Professor Sebastián Edwards of 
September 13, 2005). 
104. Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 170 (Sept. 5, 2008). 
105. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 340 (May 12, 2005) 11 ICSID Rep. 237 (2007). 
106. Kent & Harrington, supra note 92, at 259. 
107. Id. 
108. Lénárd, supra note 12. 
109. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 217 (May 12, 2005) 11 ICSID Rep. 237 (2007). 
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Enron,110 Sempra,111 Suez / Vivendi and AWG,112 Suez / InterAgua,113 
Impregilo,114 Total,115 and BG116 concluded that Argentina could not 
rely on the necessity defense as codified in Article 25 of the ILC Articles 
in the given situations.117  
In particular, the CMS tribunal—which decided one of the very 
first cases to be quoted by most of the following arbitral tribunals in 
their decisions—asserted that the need to avoid a major crisis, with all 
the social and political consequences that it implied, might constitute 
an “essential interest of the State.”118According to the tribunal, the 
“crisis was indeed severe”119 enough to justify the actions of the 
government to prevent an escalation and risk the total collapse of the 
economy.120 However, the tribunal did not consider that the crisis was 
of such gravity to justify an invocation of the necessity defense.121 
Nevertheless, the tribunal took note of the gravity of the economic 
 
110. Enron Corp et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
Award, ¶ 293 (May 22, 2007). 
111. Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 346 (Sept. 28, 2007); see also Marie Christine 
Hoelck Thjoernelund, State of Necessity as an Exception from State 
Responsibility for Investments, 13 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 423, 466–
474 (2009) (discussing the arbitral court’s decision not to find necessity); 
Federica Cristani, The Sempra Annulment Decision of 29 June 2010 and 
Subsequent Developments in Investment Arbitration Dealing with the 
Necessity Defence, 15 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 237 (2013) (tracing the 
development of the necessity defense after the Sempra case). 
112. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and Vivendi Universal 
SA v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19; AWG Group v. 
Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Decision on Liability (July 30, 
2010).  
113. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and InterAgua 
Servicios Integrales del Agua SA v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010). 
114. Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, 
Award, ¶ 359 (June 21, 2011). 
115. Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision 
on Liability, ¶ 485 (Dec. 27, 2010). 
116. BG Group Plc. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL case, Final Award, ¶ 
381 (Dec. 24, 2007). 
117. See Binder, supra note 96. 
118. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 93 (May 12, 2005) 11 ICSID Rep. 237 (2007). 
119. Id. ¶ 320. 
120. Id. ¶ 356. 
121. Id. ¶ 322. 
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situation in Argentina when determining the amount of compensation 
due to the claimants.122 
As for the “only way” requirement, laid down in Article 25 of the 
ILC Articles,123 the tribunal took note that the positions of the parties 
and of the economists diverged on the point.124 Indeed, while Argentina 
supported that the measures adopted were the “only ones” available, 
the claimant argued that alternatives were available to Argentina (but 
it did not specify which measures Argentina could have adopted).125 
The tribunal agreed with the claimants, finding that “which of these 
policy alternatives would have been better is a decision beyond the 
scope of the Tribunal’s task, which is to establish there was only one 
way or various ways and thus whether the requirements for the 
preclusion of wrongfulness have or have not been met.”126 According to 
the tribunal, Argentina had other means available to deal with the crisis 
(but it did not refer to specific means that could be available) and, 
therefore, did not meet the requirements imposed by Article 25 of the 
ILC Articles.127 Finally, the tribunal concluded that Argentina’s 
contribution to the crisis was “sufficiently substantial and not merely 
incidental or peripheral.”128  
In this respect, the difficulty in bringing policy-relevant issues to 
judicial evaluation should be highlighted.129 Some States have indeed 
argued the existence of a general principle under international law, 
according to which disputes involving political questions are exempted 
from review by international courts and tribunals.130 However, there are 
some factors that are worth mentioning in this respect. First, states 
have often brought cases involving national security issues in 
international for a.131 Moreover, international tribunals, including the 
 
122. Id. ¶ 356. 
123. G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 25 (Jan. 28, 2002). 
124. See Thjoernelund, supra note 111, at 446. 
125. Id. 
126. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 323 (May 12, 2005) 11 ICSID Rep. 237 (2007). 
127. Id. ¶ 324. 
128. Id. ¶ 329, at 95–96; Thjoernelund, supra note 111, at 448. 
129. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 90, (1933). 
130. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 178 (June 27); see also Ian 
Brownlie, The Justiciability of Disputes and Issues in International 
Relations, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 123 (1967); William W. Thayer, 
International Arbitration of Justiciable Disputes, 26 HARV. L. REV. 416 
(1912–1913). 
131. See Burke-White & Von Staden, supra note 58, at 377. 
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International Court of Justice, the European Court of Justice, the 
European Court of Human Rights as well as several arbitral tribunals, 
have regularly decided cases concerning national security matters.132 
Also investment arbitral tribunals, although established to deal 
specifically with “merely” investment disputes, have faced questions of 
a quasi-constitutional nature, such as the legally permissible responses 
to a massive economic collapse or the definition of public morality.133 
In particular, these tribunalsdealt with regulatory acts of host states, 
as in the case of Argentina, which enacted domestic measures to 
overcome a national financial and economic crisis.134 Measures of this 
kind can be considered an expression of the public’s concern of the State 
in financial and economic matters, since these matters are aimed at the 
economic and financial stability of the State itself.135 
As a general rule, the legitimate exercise of regulatory powers, 
aimed at protecting the environment, health and other welfare interests 
of society, requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, 
among other variables, the economic impact, the degree of interference 
with the investor’s reasonable expectations, and the character of the 
governmental action.136 Consequently, the issue still largely depends on 
the consideration of arbitral tribunals.137  
The arbitral tribunal in the Suez case has perhaps endorsed the 
most well-reasoned analysis of regulatory measures taken during a 
financial and economic crisis. Here, the arbitral tribunal recognized that 
Argentina, in enacting measures aimed at coping the financial and 
economic crisis, has exercised its police powers.138 Consequently, it 
found that no unlawful expropriation had occurred because of such 
measures.139 Indeed, the tribunal stated that:  
In evaluating a claim of expropriation it is important to recognize 
a State’s legitimate right to regulate and to exercise its police 
 
132. See Richard B. Bilder, Judicial Procedures Relating to the Use of Force, 
31 VIRGINIA J. INT’L. L. 242, 269 (1991). 
133. See Burke-White & Von Staden, supra note 58, at 372. 
134. See AWG Group v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Decision on 
Liability (July 30, 2010). 
135. Federica Cristani, From Silence to Equitable Compensation: ‘Valuing’ 
Financial and Economic Crises in Investment Arbitration 1, 23 (Pázmány 
Law Working Papers Nr. 2016/3 2016). 
136. Id. at 24. 
137. Paolo Bertoli et al., Regulatory Measures, Standards of Treatment and 
the Law Applicable to Investment Disputes, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, INT’L 
LAW AND COMMON CONCERNS 26, 33 (Tullio Treves et al. eds., 2014) 
138. AWG Group v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Decision on 
Liability, ¶¶ 139–40 (July 30, 2010). 
139. Id. ¶ 140, at 52. 
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power in the interests of public welfare and not to confuse 
measures of that nature with expropriation. […] In analyzing the 
measures taken by Argentina to cope with the crisis, the tribunal 
finds that, given the nature of the severe crisis facing the country, 
those general measures were within the general police powers of 
the Argentine State, and they did not constitute a permanent and 
substantial deprivation of the Claimants’ investments. […] The 
Tribunal therefore concludes that such measures did not violate 
the above quoted BIT articles with respect to direct or indirect 
expropriation.140 
However, as the tribunal clearly pointed out, “that is not to say 
that they have not violated other treaty commitments.”141 The tribunal 
found that the same measure, while not constituting unlawful 
expropriation of the rights of foreign investors, did nevertheless breach 
the fair and equitable standard, as included in a provision of the 
applicable BIT.142 In this respect, the tribunal did “balance the 
legitimate and reasonable expectations of the Claimants with 
Argentina’s right to regulate the provision of a vital public service,”143 
concluding that, “when faced with the crisis, Argentina . . .  enacted 
various measures . . . Such actions were outside the scope of its 
legitimate right to regulate and in effect constituted an abuse of 
regulatory discretion”.144 
A few months after the Suez decision, the arbitral tribunal in Total 
summarized the criteria to be followed when assessing the impact of 
regulatory measures taken during a financial and economic crisis:  
The host-State’s right to regulate domestic matters in the public 
interest . . . requires . . . a weighing of the Claimant’s reasonable 
and legitimate expectations on the one hand and the 
Respondent’s legitimate regulatory interest on the other. Thus . 
. .[t]he context of the evolution of the host economy, the 
reasonableness of the normative changes challenged and their 
appropriateness in the light of a criterion of proportionality . . . 
have to be taken into account.145 
Consequently, the balance between the state’s regulatory powers 
and the investor’s expectations must be assessed on a case-by-case 
 
140. Id. ¶¶ 139–140, at 52. 
141. Id. ¶ 140, at 52. 
142. Id. ¶ 245, at 95. 
143. Id. ¶ 236, at 91. 
144. Id. ¶ 237, at 92. 
145. Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision 
on Liability, ¶ 123 (Dec. 27, 2010). 
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basis, taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances.146 
Looking at investment case law, one may observe a quite recent 
tendency to apply the proportionality test to balance the different 
interests involved.  
In Suez the arbitral tribunal denied Argentina’s claim of the 
necessity defense.147 However, the case differs from the others involving 
Argentina because the necessity defense was raised to claim that the 
alleged unlawful measures were necessary to comply with human rights 
obligations, i.e. the obligation to afford rights to water to its 
population.148 Under such circumstances, “[the tribunal] must balance 
the legitimate and reasonable expectations of the Claimants with 
Argentina’s right to regulate the provision of a vital public service.”149 
Nonetheless it concluded that the measures adopted by Argentina did 
breach the fair and equitable obligation towards foreign investors.150 
In Saur, similar to Suez, the tribunal affirmed that it had account 
for “human rights in general and the right to water in particular” 
insofar as they belong to the general principles of international law.151 
However, such a finding was of no particular help for Argentina.152  
As has been affirmed, notwithstanding some attempts by arbitral 
tribunals to balance all the interests at stake, “the impact of human 
rights considerations on the decision by [investment] tribunals remains 
a matter for speculation.”153 
One last note should be made on how an emergency situation may 
affect the question of compensation. In the Argentine investment 
arbitration cases, the situation of emergency, even though it did not 
justify the successful invocation of the necessity defense under 
customary international law, was nevertheless taken into account by 
arbitrators in the determination of the amount of the “equitable” 
 
146. Bertoli et al., supra note 137, at 36. 
147. Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision 
on Liability, ¶ 345 (Dec. 27, 2010).  
148. Attila Tanzi, On Balancing Foreign Investment Interests with Public 
Interests in Recent Arbitration Case Law in the Public Utilities Sector, 
11 THE LAW & PRAC. OF INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 47, 57 (2012). 
149. AWG Group v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Decision on 
Liability, ¶ 345, at 91 (July 30, 2010). 
150. See Cristani, supra note 135.  
151. Saur International SA v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/4, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 330 (June 6, 2012). 
152. See generally AWG Group v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case, 
Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010). 
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compensation due.154 For example, in CMS, the tribunal decided to take 
into account the “magnitude of the crisis faced by Argentina in 
determining the amount of compensation due to the claimant;155 in 
Sempra, the tribunal took into account the crisis conditions affecting 
Argentina when determining the compensation due for the liability 
found in connection with the breach of the Treaty standards;156 and in 
National Grid, the tribunal took into account the economic crisis when 
determining the quantum of compensation due.157  
In the framework of investment arbitration, therefore, a uniform 
and conclusive interpretation and application of the necessity defense 
has not yet been reached. Indeed, when dealing with the customary rule 
of necessity, a State is faced with the difficulty to meet the stringent 
requirements imposed by Article 25 of the ILC Articles.158 To date, no 
arbitral tribunal (at least in the investment arbitration context) has 
successfully upheld a state’s necessity defense under customary 
international law.159 
However, the reasonings of the arbitral tribunals reviewed in this 
Article can be useful in determining how the Pandemic can be invoked 
by host states to justify alleged breaches of international obligations 
towards foreign investors. 
B. Applying the customary law rule of the necessity defense during the 
pandemic 
As mentioned, during the Pandemic, states around the world 
adopted regulatory measures to contain and mitigate the spread of the 
Pandemic.160 These measures affect foreign investors.161 This adoption 
could trigger investor-state arbitrations, with foreign investors claiming 
the breach of international investment obligations by host states.  
 
154. See Cristani, supra note 135, at 21–22. 
155. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 356, 444–55, at 103, 129–33 (May 12, 2005) 11 
ICSID Rep. 237 (2007). 
156. Sempra case, note 98, ¶ 397, at 117. 
157. National Grid P.L.C. v. Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL case, Award 
¶ 274 (Nov. 3, 2008). See also Cristani, supra note 135. 
158. See Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, 
Decision on Liability, ¶ 345 (Dec. 27, 2010). 
159. See e.g., AWG Group v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Decision 
on Liability ¶¶ 260–65 (July 30, 2010). 
160. See Ostrove et al., supra note 62.  
161. See Paddeu & Parlett, supra note 56.  
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Some BITs already include public health exceptions or, more 
generally, allow for the exercise of police powers, which can be invoked 
by host states to justify measures adopted during the Pandemic.162 
Moreover, host states might invoke the customary rule of the 
necessity defense. As mentioned, to successfully invoke a necessity 
defense, a state shall meet the following requirements: (1) there must 
be a grave and imminent peril; which (2) must threaten an essential 
interest; (3) the act must not seriously impair the essential interest of 
another states of the international community as a whole; and (4) it 
should be the only way to safeguard the interest of the state.163 A state 
cannot invoke the defense if it contributed to the situation of 
necessity.164  
The outbreak of the Pandemic could be understood as being a 
“grave and imminent peril” for a state, taken also into account the 
global scale of the phenomenon, 165 which constitutes an imminent 
threat and harm to the public health and well-being of the population 
in each state.166 
Furthermore, the WHO decision to classify the Pandemic as a 
Public Health Emergency of International Concern, coupled with the 
declaration of emergencies in several EUC states and the consequent 
emergency measures that have been adopted to contain the spread of 
the Pandemic make it quite apparent that it threatens an essential 
interest of the state (and the international community).167 Notably, the 
well-being of a states’ population has already been considered an 
“essential interest” by investment arbitral tribunal.168 For example, in 
National Grid, the arbitral tribunal affirmed that “the actions of the 
 
162. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (entered into force 
Dec. 20, 2015). See also Federica Paddeu et al., Italian Branch of the 
International Law Association (ILA), Litigating COVID-19 under 
International Law, YOUTUBE (May 27, 2020), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RaQmSImsqWY 
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Law of State Responsibility: Part II, EJIL: TALK! BLOG (March 17, 
2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/covid-19-and-defences-in-the-law-of-
state-responsibility-part-ii [[https://perma.cc/TD2H-YNMG]. 
165. See Ostrove et al., supra note 62.  
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[state] had as an objective the protection of social stability and the 
maintenance of essential services vital to the health and welfare of the 
population, an objective which is recognized in the framework of the 
international law of human rights”.169 In Suez, the tribunal recognized 
that “[t]he provision of water and sewage services . . . was vital to the 
health and well-being of . . . [the] people and was therefore an essential 
interest of the . . . State”.170 
On the other hand, demonstrating that the measures adopted are 
“the only way” to safeguard the essential interest against the grave and 
imminent peril might be quite challenging. For example in Enron, the 
tribunal stated, “there are always many approaches to address and 
correct . . . critical events.”171 And indeed, EU states did not adopt 
uniform approaches to contain the Pandemic in their own territory.172 
As to the requirement that the measures must not seriously impair 
an essential interest of another state or of the international community 
as a whole, arbitral tribunals have been consistent in assessing the well-
being of a state’s population as superior to the interests of foreign 
investors.173 
Instead, one problematic aspect might be non-contribution by the 
state invoking the necessity defense,174 which, in the words of the ILC, 
must be “sufficiently substantial and not merely incidental or 
peripheral.”175 While some arbitral tribunals interpreted such 
requirement in a restrictive way, as in Impregilo, according to which “a 
State’s contribution to its necessity situation need not be specifically 
intended or planned—it can be the consequence, inter alia, of well-
intended but ill-conceived policies,”176 others considered that a certain 
degree of fault should be assessed, as stated by the tribunal in Urbaser 
that “it should be shown that the Government’s acts were . . . at least 
of such a nature that the Government must have known that such crisis 
 
169. National Grid P.L.C. v. Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL case, Award 
¶ 245 (Nov. 3, 2008).  
170. AWG Group v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Decision on 
Liability ¶ 260–65 (July 30, 2010) 
171. Enron Corp et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
Award, ¶ 308 (May 22, 2007); see also CMS Gas Transmission Company 
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 323 (May 
12, 2005) 11 ICSID Rep. 237 (2007). For a comment, see Paddeu, supra 
note 164 and Paddeu & Parlett, supra note 56.  
172. See Paddeu & Jephcott, supra note 164.  
173. See id.; Paddeu & Parlett, supra note 56.  
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and emergency must have been the outcome of its economic and 
financial policy.”177 
Actually, the assessment of non-contribution by a state would need 
to be considered on a case-by-case basis. While the virus outbreak 
might be considered something that states could not foresee, the 
consequences of the measures adopted to monitor and contain the 
Pandemic could be understood as being envisaged by the states 
themselves.178 Accordingly, tribunals might determine that the states 
contributed to the crisis, to the extent that they could foresee the 
economic and social consequences of the anti-COVID-19 measures 
adopted. 
Finally, if a situation of necessity is found, the period during which 
it was applicable needs to also be assessed. In this respect, an arbitral 
tribunal will also have to consider the exact starting and ending dates 
of the emergency situation.179 
Overall, there will be several challenges for states to rely on the 
customary rule of necessity with regard to the anti-COVID-19 
measures.180 However, given the exceptional character of the Pandemic, 
a more flexible approach in applying the necessity defense requirements 
may be needed.181 It will be interesting to see how investment arbitral 
tribunal will address these questions. 
Finally, in recent years, a number of states have invoked the police 
powers doctrine as a defense in investment claims involving the 
assessment of the implementation of regulatory measures182 aimed at 
protecting public health. The Philip Morris case is quite telling in this 
respect.183 In Phillip Morris, the arbitral tribunal concluded that the 
decision of the state to require a plain packaging for tobacco products 
was adopted in the exercise of the state’s police power with the aim to 
protect public health.184 The tribunal reasoned that “[p]rotecting public 
health has since long been recognized as an essential manifestation of 
 
177. Urbaser S.A. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, 
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the State’s police power;”185 accordingly, “the Challenged Measures 
were a valid exercise by Uruguay of its police powers for the protection 
of public health,”186 reaffirming that,  
The responsibility for public health measures rests with the 
government and investment tribunals should pay great deference 
to governmental judgments of national needs in matters such as 
the protection of public health. In such cases respect is due to the 
‘discretionary exercise of sovereign power, not made irrationally 
and not exercised in bad faith’ . . . [and] ‘[t]he sole inquiry for the 
Tribunal . . . is whether or not there was a manifest lack of 
reasons for the legislation.187  
The arbitral tribunal in that case also recalled the award rendered 
in 1903 by the Germany-Venezuela Claims Commission in the Bischoff 
case, according to which “[c]ertainly during an epidemic of an infectious 
disease there can be no liability for the reasonable exercise of police 
powers.”188 Other investment tribunals, like in Chemtura189 and 
Apotex190, confirmed this approach.191 
On this issue, it can be also briefly mentioned that the recent EU-
Singapore Investment Protection Agreement restates the Parties’ “right 
to regulate . . . to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the 
protection of public health . . . . “ and provides that “the mere fact 
that a Party regulates . . . in a manner which negatively affects an 
investment or interferes with an investor’s expectations, including its 
expectations of profits, does not amount to a breach of an obligation” 
under the treaty.192 
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Accordingly, states might find it more convenient to rely on the 
police power doctrine when justifying the measures adopted during the 
Pandemic before investment arbitral tribunals—especially, as already 
mentioned, when it is already envisaged by the applicable IIA. 
IV.  Conclusion 
International investment law and customary international law 
provide a range of instruments that can be used during emergency 
situations. These instruments are meant to be used as a justification 
for states that choose not to comply with international obligations 
because of a grave situation undermining national essential interests.193  
Nevertheless, especially when it comes to the customary rule of the 
necessity defense, investment arbitration case law is not very helpful, 
since the defense has been subject to diverse interpretations.194 In 
responding to the Pandemic, several EU states have declared states of 
national emergency or epidemiological emergencies and have adopted 
anti-COVID-19 measures on such grounds.195 In such cases, states may 
seek to invoke the state of emergency when relying on an essential 
security clause in the applicable IIA or under the customary law rule 
of the necessity defense. 196 
However, it should be noticed that emergency clauses in IIAs and 
the customary rule of necessity have developed as temporary exceptions 
and defenses, with stringent requirements for their application.197 If the 
state of emergency is likely to persist in the medium- or long-term, 
maybe we should rethink how we want to reshape international 
obligations of states towards foreign investors and the relevant 
exceptions, allowing for a higher degree of flexibility in their application 
by investment arbitral tribunals that will be asked to assess all the 
circumstances at stake that have led to the adoption of national 
measures affecting foreign investor’s rights.198  
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